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THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMI-
NATION:E QUITY,E QUALITY
AND DIVERSITY IN THE NEW
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION
1. Introduction
The proposed Constitution of the European Union
serves a number of purposes. It should describe the
mechanics of the governance of the Union.It should
provide a concise statement of the purposes and
objectives of the Union. Ideally, it should do so in
language which gives inspiration to the citizens of
the Union. The US Constitution, which achieves all
of these, is one of the most important and influential
documents in world history.
The US constitution has enduring influence because
it was the product, not just of shrewed bargaining
between interest groups – although that was impor-
tant – but also the result of profound debate about
the nature of the republic, the values of American
society and the functions of a modern state. The
development of a European constitution ought to be
the result of similar insight and discussion over the
description of European culture and European val-
ues. The collapse of political negotiations about
appropriate governance arrangements may provide
an opportunity to begin that wider intellectual
debate.This chapter is written in the hope of provok-
ing such discussion in an area in which the draft con-
stitution contains some poorly conceived provisions –
that of discrimination and non-discrimination.
A fundamental purpose of a constitution is to distin-
guish between strategic and tactical issues of policy
formation in a democratic society. Strategic issues
describe broad objectives; tactical issues concern the
means by which these objectives are to be achieved.
A constitution which is difficult but not impossible
to amend limits the ability of government or legisla-
ture to compromise long-term objectives for short-
term advantage. It is a mechanism of social and eco-
nomic pre-commitment (Holmes 1991, 1996).
In this way modern constitutions typically enshrine
freedom of speech and prohibit imprisonment with-
out due process. These are not absolute rights and
may be overridden in extreme circumstances. But
the effect of establishing them as constitutional
rights is to ensure that they are not lightly over-
turned. Restricting such rights requires time, careful
consideration, and a wide political consensus.
Making judges the defenders of constitutional prin-
ciples gives them the role of defending broad social
goals against pragmatic political pressures. This is
one element in the checks and balances characteris-
tic of a society which is both democratic and free.
This is,however,a more limited role than the judicial
activism – the positive development of new social
and economic policies – which has sometimes, and
controversially, been undertaken by the Supreme
Court of the United States. It is not a European tra-
dition to follow this approach,and there is little incli-
nation to adopt it: the development of policy is
instead the function of democratic political institu-
tions. The assertion of non-discrimination as a prin-
ciple comparable to freedom of speech and due
process is a fundamental mistake, because non dis-
crimination is a value of a quite different kind, and
one which requires subjective interpretation. The
likely outcome of the process which will follow will
not necessarily advance the worthy objectives of
those who have advocated measures against discrim-
ination. Their legitimate concerns relate to a dis-
parate group of issues – the elimination of racism,
the advancement of women in business and politics,
the provision of social support for disabled people,
and the creation of a true common market within the
European Union.These issues have little in common
with each other, save that each is most effectively
handled by carefully tailored social and economic
policies which are specific to time and place.
If the constitution’s reiterated references to “non-
discrimination” had purely declaratory force, they
would matter little. The potential problem is that
they may exclude precisely the specific and pragmat-
ic approaches which are required to meet the under-
lying objectives. The potential consequence is that
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policy is not determined by a political process or a
rational assessment of costs and benefits, but
emerges from judicial interpretation of the language
of a constitutional provision.
Our fear that a principle of non-discrimination will
not help and may hinder the search for policies that
promote the substantive objectives of the European
Union is not a purely theoretical concern. Practical
experience of the reunification of Germany provides
a clear example and warning. In that country, the
political and constitutional imperative of non-dis-
crimination between residents of the former eastern
and western provinces has in practice worked
against the interests of economic assimilation of the
eastern zone.Extending to the east labour legislation
and benefits designed for the much richer west put
back long-term development goals in the east and
imposed substantial economic burdens on the west.
The danger is that this specific problem will be repli-
cated in dealings between the existing EU members
and the accession states, and that this example will
be repeated in many other areas where a legal
requirement not to discriminate conflicts with the
achievement of widely held social and economic
goals.
2. Non-discrimination in the draft constitution
The draft Constitution makes frequent and casual use
of the phrase non-discrimination. Article 2 of the
draft Constitution – the Union’s values – declares that
The Union is founded on the values of respect for
human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the
rule of law and respect for human rights. These
values are common to the Member States in a
society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity
and non-discrimination.
Article 3 reiterates that “the Union shall combat
social exclusion and discrimination”.
But non-discrimination is not a value of the same
kind as pluralism, tolerance, justice and solidarity. In
fact, discrimination is essential to modern economic
life. We discriminate in the students we admit, the
friends we choose, the workers we employ, the con-
tractors we hire. We discriminate between people
who are guilty of crimes and those who are not.“The
word to ‘discriminate’, once divested of its emotion-
al connotation, simply means to distinguish or draw
a line” (Fisk 1976, p.109). What is objectionable is
not discrimination as such, but inappropriate dis-
crimination – arbitrary discrimination, invidious dis-
crimination. (Karst [1969], defines and distinguishes
these latter terms).
But the question of whether a particular form of dis-
crimination is appropriate or inappropriate is inher-
ently subjective and relative, and it is both proper
and inevitable that the forms of discrimination we
think appropriate and inappropriate change over
time.The forms of discrimination that typically cause
most concern – discrimination on grounds of race,
gender and sexual orientation – cause such concern
precisely because changing social values have led to
changes in views of appropriate and inappropriate
grounds of discrimination.The distinguishing charac-
teristic of areas of potential discrimination such as
race, gender and sexual orientation is that they are
ones which have been the subject of recent con-
tention – a century ago, such discrimination was a
widely accepted social practice.
We do nothing about discrimination on grounds that
most people would think inappropriate but few peo-
ple have ever engaged in (e.g. discrimination on
grounds of star sign or height, or the use of hand-
writing tests in selecting personnel) or about dis-
crimination on grounds that most people would con-
sider appropriate (e.g. discrimination on the basis of
experience or educational qualifications).
A generalised non-discrimination requirement
raises some fundamental issues to which answers are
not at all obvious. What are the criteria by which
appropriate and inappropriate grounds of discrimi-
nation are identified? In what circumstances should
inappropriate discrimination – by public or private
agents – be prohibited? What mechanisms should be
put in place to limit inappropriate discrimination?
These questions are considered further below.
Discrimination, whether appropriate or inappropri-
ate, may be observed in several ways. The most
straightforward is the blatantly discriminatory
practice – the sign that says blacks will not be served,
the job advertisement that excludes women.
Discrimination may be inferred from the difference
between the actual composition of a workforce or
customer base and the composition of the potential
workforce or customer base. Extreme cases are easy
to identify, but in many instances the inference of
discrimination may be difficult to draw or refute.Most discrimination cases today are individual cases,
in which a single person claims that a particular deci-
sion – to dismiss, to not promote, to refuse to serve –
was made on inappropriate grounds. The existence
of discrimination is not in dispute: it is the basis of
discrimination which is at issue. Such cases are
inevitably difficult to resolve because the court or
other adjudicating body must infer motive from the
circumstances of the decision.This is a powerful rea-
son for limiting legal prohibition of discrimination to
areas of policy in which urgent social or economic
issues arise.
After the very general statement of Article 2,
Article II-21 narrows the ground:
1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic
features, language, religion or belief, political or
any other opinion, membership of a national
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual
orientation shall be prohibited.
2. Within the scope of application of the Cons-
titution and without prejudice to any of its specif-
ic provisions, any discrimination on grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited.
The phrase “any ground such as” clearly envisages
that the list is not exhaustive, but does not explain
the criteria by which other grounds of impermissible
discrimination might appropriately be added.
There is a striking contrast between the wide scope
and definitive prohibition of Article II-21 and the
weak reiteration of similar sentiments in Article III/8:
1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of the
Constitution and within the limits of the power
conferred by it upon the Union, a European law
or framework law of the Council of Ministers
may establish the measures needed to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic ori-
gin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual ori-
entation.The Council of Ministers shall act unan-
imously after obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament.
2. Any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions
of work and employment shall be prohibited.
Articles II-21 and III-8 give a clear indication of the
intended scope of the declaration made in Article 2
and the objective – to combat discrimination –
announced for the Union in Article 3.To understand
their economic effects,it is necessary to consider why
individuals, businesses and public organisations
engage in discrimination.
3. The economics of discrimination
The principal literature on the law and economics of
discrimination is found in the United States and
inevitably reflects the legal framework there. The
central constitutional provision is the Fourteenth
Amendment, passed in the immediate aftermath of
the Civil War, which declares that no State of the
Union may “deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws”. This require-
ment is limited in extent and relates to government
rather than private action: it superseded the notori-
ous Supreme Court’s Dred Scott judgement of 1857,
which upheld slavery in the southern states and was,
almost a century later,the basis for the 1954 decision
in Brown vs. Board of Education, which declared
separate school facilities for blacks and whites illegal
and began the process of racial desegregation in the
United States. The main anti-discrimination provi-
sions of US law,however,are the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968, which attack discrimination by race
and by gender,and the Disability Rights Act of 1990,
which follows a similar model.
The economics of discrimination begins by asking
why people engage in discrimination and what costs
such discrimination imposes – on the person who
discriminates, the person discriminated against and
on society as a whole. It is conventional to distin-
guish two broad types of discrimination. Individuals
may have what Becker (1957) calls “a taste for dis-
crimination”: they are motivated by animosity – dis-
like of a particular group or of the characteristics of
that group. And individuals and organisations may
practice statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972,
Arrow 1973): selection on the basis of generalisa-
tions from the average characteristics of a group that
are valid or believed to be valid – such as the use of
test scores in student admissions.
These forms of discrimination are often conflated,
both by those who practice discrimination and by
those who oppose it.Animosity towards a group may
be fuelled by (true or false) beliefs about the charac-
teristics of the group, and decisions purportedly
based on statistical generalisation may in reality be
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dictated by animosity. But many people display ani-
mosity without any statistical basis for their preju-
dices, and many people practice statistical discrimi-
nation without any animosity towards those they dis-
criminate against.
This distinction is mirrored in an analysis of the costs
and consequences of discrimination. Animosity leads
to inappropriate selection criteria – as when the con-
siderations that enter hiring decisions are not those
which “fit” the proper purpose of finding the best
employees for the job.Such criteria are both over and
under inclusive (Tussman and ten Broek 1949) – lead-
ing to the appointment of unsuitable members of the
favoured group and to the rejection of suitable mem-
bers of the disfavoured group. Discrimination based
on animosity is costly because of this irrationality (in
the ordinary sense of the word irrational, rather than
in the economists’ sense,which normally relates to the
maintenance of consistent preferences.)
The costs of such discrimination depend on the com-
petitiveness of the market in which discrimination is
practiced (Becker 1957). An individual trader (not
based in Canada) who dislikes Canadians and re-
fuses to deal with them imposes modest costs on his
or her own business (by diverting a class of potential
customers to competitors) and a very small cost on
Canadians (who can obtain service or employment
elsewhere).And because animosity imposes costs on
the person who displays such animosity, it will tend
not to survive or grow in competitive markets. The
costs of discrimination become substantial only if a
systematic pattern of animosity is displayed by many
traders in the same market – if, in effect, there is a
discriminatory cartel.
As with all cartels, the more effective the cartel the
greater the benefits from cheating on it. If animosity
towards a particular group is widespread, then traders
who do not display such animosity can derive substan-
tial competitive benefits from this behaviour.The prac-
tice of discrimination is therefore likely to continue
only if other social and commercial pressures are
brought to bear against those who deviate from the
cartel behaviour. This was indeed the mechanism by
which racial segregation in commercial life continued
in the United States for many decades (Sunstein 2002,
158) and it also underpinned religious discrimination
in many parts of Europe for decades, if not centuries.
Discrimination based on animosity will therefore
have significant economic consequences in competi-
tive markets if, and only if, it is associated with
deeply and widely held patterns of animosity in soci-
ety. While there can be little dispute that this was
once true of both racial and religious animosity, it is
more difficult to argue that such discrimination is
common today. As with all economic cartels, once
significant numbers of traders defect from the cartel
– in this case, no longer feel either desire to discrim-
inate or social pressure to do so – the arrangement
rapidly unwinds,as the costs of continued adherence
to the discriminatory practice outweigh the benefits.
Discrimination based on animosity is, properly, a
particular concern in the public sector, which often
holds a monopoly of access to particular functions.
And it also raises problems in private sector mono-
polies also.European competition law recognises the
link between the adverse consequences of discrimi-
nation and the existence of monopoly and cartels.
Case law under Article 82 establishes that dominant
firms have a “special responsibility” which means
they may not discriminate between customers or
refuse to supply without “objective justification”:
non-dominant firms are free to engage in price dis-
crimination and to supply (and refuse to supply) as
they choose (Bellamy and Child 2001).
Statistical discrimination finds such objective justifi-
cation in data on group characteristics. It would not
be possible to conduct business without statistical
discrimination. Most decisions about hiring, about
promotion,about the choice of suppliers rely at least
to some degree on knowledge and experience of
general properties of groups rather than specific
knowledge of the future performance of the individ-
ual or business selected. It cannot be otherwise.
Thus while the reduction of discrimination resulting
from animosity yields economic benefits, the elimi-
nation of statistical discrimination imposes economic
costs. (Norman 2003). Such costs will not arise if the
assumptions on which statistical discrimination is
based are false.But if discrimination is based on mis-
information rather than animosity it can be expected
that the provision of valid information will quickly
reduce it: legal and constitutional provisions should
not be necessary.
Yet the acceptability of statistical discrimination
does not hinge solely on the quality of the statistics
which underpin it. In the nineteenth century, many –
perhaps most – well educated, liberal people gen-
uinely believed that the intelligence of blacks andfemales was lower than that of white men,and on the
limited evidence before them it was not unreason-
able for them to believe this. It is because we know
now that these beliefs were false that we are particu-
larly sensitive today to race and gender based dis-
crimination. But no research on the relative intelli-
gences of different groups, whatever its results – and
there is persuasive evidence of difference in the
nature if not the quantity of male and female intelli-
gences, (see, for example, Baron-Cohen 2003) –
would today render racial or gender discrimination
admissible. Our concern is that the widespread prac-
tice of rational statistical discrimination will lead to
the creation, or continuation, of disadvantaged
groups.
Statistical discrimination is normally what is at issue
in complaints about age and gender discrimination
since animosity towards old people or women is rare
(in contrast to discrimination on grounds of race or
sexual orientation, where animosity was historically
widespread). Older people may, on average, be less
well equipped to perform certain tasks, but that is
not necessarily true of any particular individual.
Such an argument does not differ in any fundamen-
tal way, however, from the argument that although,
on average, doctors may have greater medical
knowledge than laymen, this is not necessarily true
in any particular case. It is hard to believe, however,
that many people would regard provisions which
demand medical qualifications from those who per-
form certain tasks as representing inappropriate sta-
tistical discrimination.
Legislative attacks on statistical discrimination must
therefore balance the economic costs of its prohibi-
tion against the social benefits of anti-subordination
(Fisk 1976) provisions which protect the interests of
potentially disadvantaged groups.That is why we are
untroubled by discrimination against unqualified
medical practitioners. The costs of ignoring the sta-
tistics and allowing them to practice are potentially
large – the costs of the stigma suffered by those
excluded seems relatively minor.In other cases,how-
ever, the balancing of costs and benefits is more
problematic.
Racial profiling exemplifies the issue. In the US
racial profiling is sometimes described as the “dri-
ving while black”offence (Strauss 2003):it is rational
for police confronted with statistics showing that
young black men are on average more likely to be
involved in crime to question a disproportionate
number of young black drivers. Such racial profiling
might be motivated by animosity, but this need not
be the case – such a policy might well be implement-
ed by black police officers.
The consequences of racial profiling, however, may
be to increase the sense of exclusion which leads to
the observation that gives rise to it. In general, law
enforcement agencies feel required to issue (barely
credible) denials that such profiling takes place. In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) the Supreme
Court held that the immigration service did not act
illegally when officers looking for illegal immigrants
from Mexico interned disproportionate numbers of
persons of “apparent Mexican ancestry”.It is hard to
see how the Court could sensibly have reached any
other decision.But the consequences of racial profil-
ing are such that it can never be an acceptable pub-
lic policy.
These are issues with which honest and well-mean-
ing people struggle and on which there are inevitable
differences in the balances that are arrived at. And
that is why a generalised principle of non-discrimi-
nation cannot and should not be, as the draft
Constitution asserts, a fundamental European value.
Discrimination of many kinds is an indispensable
aspect of social and economic life which could not be
eradicated even if it were desirable to do so. We
should seek to eliminate inappropriate discrimina-
tion, but in itself that statement has no content
beyond an exhortation to do the right thing.To give
it meaning requires a careful,and pragmatic,analysis
of the social costs and economic consequences of
particular policies. The examples discussed below
illustrate both how important,and how difficult,that
task is.
4. Areas of non-discrimination
Article III-8 identifies the areas in which the
European Union should combat discrimination: sex,
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,
age or sexual orientation, and Article III-18 adds
nationality. Article II-21 includes property owner-
ship but this is not reproduced in Article III-18.
Political opinion also included in III-18, is perhaps
reproduced as “belief” in Article III-18.
There is a certain irony in this list, because the con-
vention which framed the constitution was selected
with a view to maintaining a careful balance between
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groups on almost all the criteria which the constitu-
tion deems as impermissible grounds of discrimina-
tion.The tension here is that between two senses of
anti-discrimination: anti-discrimination may be
defined as blindness to inappropriate distinguishing
criteria such as race; or anti-discrimination may be
represented as an anti-subordination principle in
which society seeks to prevent the emergence of sys-
tematic patterns of disadvantage. The classic article
by Fisk (1976) elaborates this distinction. The
requirements of these two objectives are not the
same, and may directly conflict: most clearly in the
case of affirmative action (which would appear to be
prohibited by the draft constitution, except in the
case of gender,for which there is a specific provision
in Article II-23). This tension has been a constant
source of difficulty in the United States,most recent-
ly in the Supreme Court’s inconclusive ruling in the
case against the University of Michigan.
The inclusion of property in Article II-21, although
not III-18, seems to be a mistake. It is hard to imag-
ine that the architects of Article II-21 intended to
prohibit residential mortgages, although Article II-
21 might appear to have that effect.Property owner-
ship is used extensively by financial institutions as a
means of statistical discrimination, for example in
credit scoring,and presumably it is not intended that
the Article II-21 prohibition should exclude this.
But what then did this provision of Article II-21
intend to prohibit? This illustrates the difficulty of
legislating through declaratory principles of this
kind.The prohibition is probably aimed at practices
such as imposing property ownership qualifications
on voting rights,which were once widespread but are
no longer. But if it is thought necessary to prohibit
discrimination of that kind, it would be better to do
so directly.Anti-discrimination provisions are aimed
at “inappropriate” discrimination. But outside areas
where the motivation for discrimination is animosity
– race, and sometimes ethnicity and religion – dis-
crimination rarely takes place unless there are some
reasonable grounds for believing such discrimination
is appropriate. The rationale for a prohibition must
therefore rely on one or the other of two grounds.
One is that the criteria employed to discriminate,
although prima facie relevant, are in fact irrelevant.
Statistical discrimination is engaged in,but mistaken.
This is a difficult argument to develop where dis-
crimination is a matter of commercial judgment and
the trader concerned will suffer financial loss by his
mistake. The alternative, and more powerful ratio-
nale for anti-discrimination rules is that the criteria
of discrimination, although relevant to the provider,
have adverse social consequences. That is the issue
posed by racial profiling.
Discrimination related to property and property
ownership illustrates these problems clearly.Lenders
have commercial incentives to make their credit
scoring procedures as refined as possible.Their prac-
tices are not generally irrational or driven by ani-
mosity. But such practices may have adverse social
consequences, as in the practice of “red-lining” by
mortgage lenders: people in disadvantaged areas
find it difficult or impossible to obtain mortgages or
other forms of credit. These policies may provoke a
spiral of further decline and decay in the areas con-
cerned.
The courts are not equipped to assess the quality of
credit scoring procedures, still less to propose strate-
gies of urban regeneration.And the practical conse-
quence of prohibiting red-lining is likely to be a
reluctance on the part of major financial institutions
to engage in low quality lending at all, rather than
the adoption of a policy of indiscriminate lending in
such areas.
Credit assessment is an example of an area where
policy developed in conjunction with financial insti-
tutions with a deliberate objective of tackling anti-
subordination offers some prospect of achieving
desirable social goals, while a policy of prohibiting
statistical discrimination is likely to have opposite
effects. The nature of markets characterised by sta-
tistical discrimination requires subtle analysis.
Gender discrimination in insurance, which is dis-
cussed in the next section, illustrates the issue well.
5. Gender discrimination in goods and services
The Commission has recently put forward proposals
(IP/03/1501, memo/03 216, November 2003) for a
directive prohibiting discrimination by gender in the
supply of goods and services. In practice, this direc-
tive is about insurance.Other examples cited of mar-
kets in which complaints about gender discrimina-
tion in the supply of goods and services have been
received are trivial.With the exception of insurance,
there are proposals for specific exemption of the
small group of industries which routinely practice
gender discrimination, such as hairdressers, beauty
salons, swimming pools and gentlemen’s clubs.Female mortality is lower at all ages than male mor-
tality and in consequence life insurance and annuity
rates are lower for women. Some forms of health
insurance, particularly permanent health insurance,
are more expensive for women, but motor insurance
is generally cheaper. This differentiation is particu-
larly marked in the UK, where competition in insur-
ance markets has led to particularly sophisticated
risk-based pricing.
Risk-based pricing in insurance markets exemplifies
statistical discrimination. The insurer determines
premiums using a range of variables correlated with
claims experience.The effect of these variables may
be causal, but often is not. It is unlikely that gender
as such affects the probability of involvement in a
motor accident:gender here acts as a proxy for other
variables,such as attitude to risk,which insurers can-
not measure directly. It is probable that gender does
have a direct effect on mortality: however the
observed relationship is confounded by the influence
of other variables, such as occupation and stress,
which are correlated with gender but not directly
caused by it. Statistical discrimination is fundamen-
tal to insurance:if there were complete knowledge of
the determinants of risk, the pooling and sharing of
uncertainties, which is intrinsic to the concept of
insurance, would be impossible.
The suppression of statistical discrimination leads to
the problems famously analysed by Akerlof (1970).
A situation where information is known to both par-
ties, but may not be used by one of them, is analyti-
cally identical to the situation described in his “mar-
ket for lemons”, where information is available to
only one party to the transaction.There is a cumula-
tive problem of adverse selection. People for whom
the product is underpriced tend to buy it, and those
for whom it is overpriced do not. As a result, the
population served is not representative of the mar-
ket as a whole.This leads to a rise in prices, followed
by further adverse selection, driving the better risks
out of the market. The overall effect is to reduce
demand for the product and in extreme cases the
market may disappear altogether.
The degree to which the disallowance of gender as a
variable in risk assessment will raise average prices
will depend on the extent of adverse selection and
the ability of insurers to work around the prohibition
by finding alternative proxy variables that achieve
the same effect.The effect will be least significant for
third party motor insurance, where purchase is com-
pulsory, and the impact of adverse selection corre-
spondingly reduced. It will be larger for products
where demand elasticities are relatively high – such
as term life insurance (life insurance without a sav-
ings component) – or where the insured product can
be effectively substituted by non-insurance products,
such as uninsured retirement savings.When insurers
are not allowed to differentiate premiums between
men and women,men will be driven out of the annu-
ity market because they will find the rates that are
needed to reflect the greater longevity of women
unattractive.
One method of avoiding adverse selection effects is
the provision of goods and services to groups rather
than to individuals – as when an employer buys cov-
erage for the whole workforce.If group membership
is effectively compulsory, the characteristics of the
insured population will be closer to the characteris-
tics of the population as a whole. Such group pur-
chasing is common in health insurance,with the con-
sequence that rates for group insurance are substan-
tially lower than the rates for similar cover sought by
individuals: in the UK, annuity rates for tax-exempt
pension savings (which require the purchase of
annuities) are,for similar reasons,higher than gener-
al annuity rates (for which adverse selection is a
problem).Thus the restriction of statistical discrimi-
nation in insurance creates two distinct kinds of mar-
ket distortion. Insured products become less attrac-
tive relative to individual arrangements which can be
used to achieve similar outcomes. Among insured
products, collective provision is favoured over indi-
vidual purchase.
The Commission’s proposal exemplifies declaratory
non-discrimination. It fails to provide any statement
of benefits in terms other than the rhetorical. The
proposals do not appear to be necessary or useful in
tackling either of the general groups of problems
which anti-discrimination provisions seek to address
– the process irrationality of discrimination driven
by animosity or the subordination of disadvantaged
groups. And the Commission’s assessment of its
planned directive contains no substantive discussion
of the consequential effects on prices and the
demand for affected services.
The attempt to prohibit particular forms of statistical
discrimination in insurance raises a broader issue. It
is very likely that in coming decades there will be
rapid increases in the ability to predict health and
life expectancy through the use of genetic informa-
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tion.At present, many countries discourage insurers
from using the relatively small number of genetic
markers – such as those for Huntington’s Chorea
and breast cancer – which have been identified.
Insurers do, however, use other variables for pur-
poses of statistical discrimination – hypertension,
which is mainly genetic in origin, is a key variable in
life insurance rating.
Existing redistribution from the healthy to the
unhealthy and young to old within the insurance sys-
tems of member states may therefore be progres-
sively undermined by the increased sophistication of
statistical discrimination. Prohibition of statistical
discrimination based on genetic factors seems a pos-
sible solution – and indeed Article II-21 might be
interpreted as having this intention or effect.
However, in order to avoid the problem of adverse
selection as explained above it is necessary that no
one,not even the insurees themselves,can obtain the
genetic information. Just preventing one side of the
market from using the information would not lead to
viable outcomes.
These are difficult problems. It is impossible, howev-
er, not to observe the contrast between the subtlety
and complexity of issues raised by statistical
discrimination in the insurance market and the poor
quality of analysis and argument presented in the
Commission’s proposals on gender discrimination in
the provision of goods and services. If Europe is to
make good policies in these areas,it needs to be bet-
ter served.
6. Disability discrimination
Most EU states have for some time had legal provi-
sions to assist disabled people, in the form of mea-
sures of social support and assistance in obtaining
employment.The widespread use of the term discrim-
ination in this context and the assertion of disability
“rights”are relatively recent developments.It appears
to result from a belief by lobbyists, initially in the
United States, that processes of the kind which had
been used against racial and gender discrimination
might be used with advantage on behalf of disabled
people.The Disability Rights Act, passed in 1990, was
consciously modelled on the Civil Rights Act, which
had tackled race and gender discrimination.
There is a hierarchy of four levels of disability dis-
crimination:
(i) The most basic is a form of prejudice or ani-
mosity, as when employers refuse work to dis-
abled people who are in all relevant respects
qualified for the job because they attach stigma
to disability in general, or to particular forms of
disability.
(ii) The next level is statistical discrimination against
disabled people. People with disabilities may, on
average,be less effective in a particular role than
others, but this is not necessarily true of any par-
ticular disabled person: however disability is
used as a characteristic to screen applicants.
Discrimination of type (i) or type (ii) results in
the unjust exclusion of disabled people from
activities for which they are fully qualified.
More expansive interpretations of discrimina-
tion concern activities for which disability is a
genuine handicap.
(iii) It is not enough for disabled peolple to be given
the same opportunities if they are not in prac-
tice able to take advantage of them.The disad-
vantages which result may be described as dis-
crimination. This concept of discrimination
implies that a form of affirmative action is
required to permit equality of outcome. The
most familiar example is the provision of wheel-
chair access to buildings and transport.
(iv) Yet another concept of discrimination demands
blindness to disability even when its conse-
quences are objectively relevant. Such a con-
cept of discrimination would prevent the exclu-
sion of physically disabled people from the
armed forces, psychologically disturbed persons
from positions of responsibility or the learning
disabled from advanced education.
This is the ultimate logic of a position which implies
that disability is an inappropriate basis for discrimi-
nation (and not merely an inappropriate basis)
when, as in (i) and (ii), it is objectively irrelevant.
While (iv) represents an extreme position, there is
increasing willingness to interpret disability discrim-
ination in this way: the broad idea is that individuals
should not suffer disadvantage from actions or
events that are not their fault and may therefore be
interpreted as disability. UK cases have included
examples of successful claims of disability discrimi-
nation against a police authority which refused
employment to a person suffering from manic
depression and by an individual sacked for employ-
ment-related misconduct while a psychiatric in-
patient (Sayle 2003). Implicit in this approach is thatindividuals should not be accountable for their
actions if these are the product of an illness, rather
than something for which they are culpable.
Measures to combat discrimination of types (i) and
(ii) are relatively uncontroversial. While there are
costs to the prohibition of any form of statistical dis-
crimination, the cost of expecting an employer to
enguire into the specific characteristics of a disabled
person seem modest relative to the potential bene-
fits of such a policy in terms of anti-subordination
arguments.
Discrimination is not a helpful concept in dealing
with issues of type (iv).The distinction between what
is culpable and what is not culpable is hard to make,
and the underlying rationale would seem to be that
misfortune, which is not culpable, should, at least in
part,be a shared social concern.But this is an issue of
solidarity, not discrimination. By treating it as thelat-
ter, the costs are transferred to the other party of an
economic transaction (generally the employer) and in
a manner which is likely to arouse resentment rather
than reinforce solidarity. There are no evident argu-
ments of equity or efficiency for doing this and the
practical consequence is to raise the costs of engaging
in any such exchange. As in the other cases cited
above, the liability creates a strong incentive to avoid
situations which might potentially give rise to such
claims – to screen out potentially difficult cases, on
objectively defensible grounds, from the beginning.
Complex issues in disability discrimination mainly
arise under (iii). In practice, expenditure motivated
by this concern seems to have been very substanti-
ally directed towards wheelchair users. It is not
apparent why this should have priority over assis-
tance to victims of other common forms of disability,
particularly deafness and blindness. But the objec-
tive of access for wheelchair users is relatively easy
to define and monitor,while equality of outcome for
those with hearing or visual impairments is inca-
pable of achievement. Priority in expenditure
appears to depend on the ease with which a charge
of discrimination can be levied.
Thus in this area policy is also shaped by rhetoric
and semantics rather than by assessment of the
costs and benefits of alternative policies. The
Commission’s recent report on disability discrimi-
nation (European Commission 2003) is remark-
able, not only for the absence of information on
costs and benefits, but for its lack of concern about
this dearth of information. We do not know how
many non-institutionalised wheelchair users there
are in the EU or in most of its member states.While
the costs of providing disabled access in new public
buildings is generally relatively small, the cost of
providing it in existing buildings may be large, but
there is little information on the magnitude of these
costs or on how it is divided between public and pri-
vate sectors. While it is important that some taxis
everywhere should be wheelchair accessible, a
requirement that all taxis be wheelchair accessible
may not be a cost effective means of meeting the
needs of disabled people. Ronald Dworkin’s (1984)
famous phrase describes “rights as trumps”, identi-
fying the nature of a right as a claim that is not com-
mensurable with other claims: so the creation of
rights precludes discussion of the cost effectiveness
of implementing these rights. The exclusion of cost
benefit analysis of provisions to assist disabled peo-
ple is not generally in the interests of disabled peo-
ple themselves.
Policies on disability are properly the province of
solidarity, not discrimination.The claim to rights has
force only if there is concomitant willingness to
assume obligations and extravagant assertions of
such rights, such as those under (iv) above, ultimate-
ly undermine the solidarity, which is the real basis of
social support for disabled people. A balanced
approach to such issues would also recognise differ-
ences between member states in willingness and
capacity to provide that support. This is not a prob-
lem that has an important Community dimension,
and provision for disabled people is an issue proper-
ly covered by the principle of subsidiarity. In other
areas of welfare provision, however, EU level poli-
cies are essential:most particularly in relation to wel-
fare provision and the free movement of labour.
7. On grounds of nationality
Economic integration is central to the objectives of
the European Union. The accession of ten new
states, whose income levels are substantially below
the average of existing members, creates significant
problems of integration.The goals are clear:the pro-
motion of growth, which will allow the accession
countries to converge towards the productivity and
living standards that have already been achieved by
the EU’s other members, and the establishment of
the four economic freedoms, including the free
movement of labour,defined by the Treaty of Rome.
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The best means of achieving these goals, however,
require carefully calculated policies. Substantive,
rather than rhetorical, non-discrimination requires
that economic life in these accession countries is sim-
ilar to that in the rest of the Union – something
which is far from the case at present. This outcome
may not be best accomplished by imposing a re-
quirement of non-discrimination on the process of
assimilation.
Political and constitutional imperatives imposed a
range of non-discrimination requirements in the
reunification of Germany. In particular, migration
was freely permitted, labour market regulation and
social benefits were aligned, and substantial wage
convergence was imposed. The effect of these mea-
sures taken as a whole was the virtual collapse of
tradable goods production in the east combined with
a large and prospectively indefinite burden of trans-
fer payments from the west; see Sinn (2002) and
EEAG Report (2003, Chapter 3).
The provision by New York City in the late 1960s of
a range of benefits on terms more generous than
elsewhere in the United States led to an influx of
poor people from other parts of the United States.In
the early 1970s, the City became technically bank-
rupt, and these policies were scaled back. The cases
of west Germany and New York, taken together,
illustrate the incompatibility of the distinct objec-
tives of non-discrimination,subsidiarity,and the eco-
nomic development of poorer areas.
Non-discrimination provisions of the Constitution
relevant to nationality are found in two areas. First,
discrimination in conditions of employment by ref-
erence to nationality is explicitly prohibited. Second
a migrant worker who is an EU citizen may receive
benefits in any member state as if he or she were a
national of that state.
The impact of migration flows depends on the size of
the differentials in income and social benefits across
the Union and on the scale of these flows (which is
itself a function of these income differentials). The
transitional provisions for accession countries allow
existing member states to restrict immigration for
employment from accession countries for up to
seven years and Germany – the largest likely recipi-
ent – will impose such restrictions, although the UK
will not. (See chapter 5 for details of these provi-
sions.) There will be no restrictions on migration for
residence.
As discussed in Chapter 5, cost estimates suggest
that the scale of economic migration will be modest
(Boeri and Brücker 2000; Home Office 2003).
However, there is little comparable historic basis for
extrapolation. Heavy reliance is placed on the expe-
rience of the Southern accession countries –
Portugal, Spain and Greece. But these states were
relatively much richer at accession than those that
will join in 2004. And while Spain, Portugal and
Greece had encouraged outward migration prior to
their EU membership, the former Communist
regimes had prohibited it. Thus there may be an
untapped reservoir of potential migration in Eastern
Europe that never existed in Southern Europe. We
do not suggest that Western Europe will be swamped
by immigrants from the accession states. We do
believe that there is simply no way of knowing what
the impact of free movement of labour on the
economies of either existing or accession members is
likely to be, and in these circumstances there should
be as much scope as possible for flexible and adap-
tive policies.
The wages of economic migrants tend to lie between
the wages of employees in their home country and
employees in their host country (Olson 1996). This
outcome is not mainly, or necessarily at all, the out-
come of discrimination based on animosity. Some of
it arises because of inefficient allocation of workers
to jobs in a labour market with which they are unfa-
miliar. But there are also reasons why such discrimi-
natory outcomes are consistent with an efficient
labour market. And workers from accession states
have, on average, less developed modern labour
market skills and experience than residents of exist-
ing member states. More broadly, nationality is a
strong proxy for variables such as mother tongue
and cultural experience,which are relevant to labour
market performance. These correlations are a basis
for statistical discrimination by employers. There is
likely to be evidence of inferred discrimination when
employers use discriminating factors that are not
themselves nationality but are correlated with
nationality as a basis for selection.
These are not significant issues within the existing
EU. To date, income differentials across member
states have not been sufficiently large to make it
attractive to recruit groups of migrant workers from
other states on any substantial scale.After accession,
the Union will experience an income dispersion wide
enough to create many opportunities of this kind.
And hitherto, concern over nationality-based dis-crimination has largely been confined to explicit
policies.But the attack on racial and gender discrim-
ination has moved on from blatant discrimination to
inferred discrimination.The same must be expected
to happen in relation to statistical discrimination
related to nationality if substantial observed differ-
ences between the wages of home and foreign EU
national workers emerge within individual member
states, as they inevitably will.
Economic migration which offers workers from
accession states better paid jobs in other parts of the
EU imposes costs but also offers significant benefits.
Migration stimulated by social benefits available in
other states is economically damaging to the state
that receives migrants and socially damaging to the
state from which they come. The attractions of such
migration will be much greater in the enlarged EU
than before.Purely social migration in search of ben-
efits is restricted under existing EU legislation by the
requirement that the claimant be connected to the
labour force, but this is not a overly demanding
requirement.
Discrimination by nationality would be a powerful
means of restricting social migration if, at least for a
period, some of the tax-financed benefits were relat-
ed to those which would be received in the home
state rather than the host state (Sinn 2000). Social
migration on any scale will undermine the legitima-
cy of free movement of persons as a fundamental
EU goal and may,as in the New York case,make the
maintenance of differing levels of social benefits in
different EU states – reflecting both the principle of
subsidiarity and the wide range of earnings level
across the EU – increasingly difficult to sustain (see
Chapter 3 of EEAG Report 2003).
8. Conclusions
We have examined the application of non-discrimi-
nation rules in three broad areas of European policy.
In each of them, policy will be better if it is made by
the careful analysis of costs and benefits in relation
to objectives than by the legal application of general
principles that sound rhetorically attractive but
whose precise meaning and practical consequences
are often unclear and must necessarily be the subject
of future judicial determination.
We advocate this approach in all the areas in which
the draft Constitution asserts the principle of non-
discrimination. If it is thought desirable to – for
example – abolish mandatory retirement ages or to
prevent employers excluding groups of potential
workers automatically on the grounds of age; such
policies would be better implemented by specific
measures than by assertion of a general principle of
age discrimination.In the other areas covered by the
proposed anti-discrimination provisions we suggest
that in general the Constitution should contain non-
binding statements of objectives and give the Com-
mission and member states the responsibility of in-
troducing specific measures of implementation. We
tentatively suggest that the relevant provisions of the
Constitution should be as follows:
• it is an objective of the European Union to com-
bat racism and to promote the development of
employment opportunities for women and their
access to positions of influence in politics, busi-
ness and other areas of public life.
• freedom of expression, of religion, of political
opinion, and of sexual orientation are fundamen-
tal values of the European Union.
• no citizen of the Union shall suffer economic dis-
advantage through exercising these freedoms, in
areas unrelated to the practice or profession of
such beliefs (this is an area where some discrimi-
nation is clearly appropriate.
• the member states of the Union shall promote eco-
nomic and social opportunities for disabled people.
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